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Summary 
Why did the climate negotiations in The Hague fail? Our contribution is to ar-
gue that the conflict between the European Union and the United States stems 
mainly from disagreement on the cost issue. We argue that three main concerns 
promoted by the European Union in The Hague, i.e. a 50% national emission 
ceiling (the supplementarity principle), the use of carbon sinks and an interna-
tional market control system, can be solved by less restrictions on free GHG 
trade and by establishing the World Trade Organization as an international au-
thority. Because the US face much higher future reduction costs than the EU, 
the US will be i mposed  considerably higher costs than the negotiations in 
Kyoto were based on. Thus, to make the US stay in an international GHG emis-
sion-trading scheme, the EU must reconsider and acknowledge US claims for 
cheaper reduction options and the right to t rade ‘hot air.’ This point is impor-
tant. If the US do not participate, the increase in emissions will be much higher 
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7
1.  Introduction 
On November 25, the global climate negotiations in The Hague collapsed. The 
negotiations in The Hague were a follow-up to the climate agreement in Kyoto, 
Japan from 11 December 1997. Here, 149 countries signed an agreement that 
allows countries to trade greenhouse gases (GHG). Out of these 149 countries, 
38 industrialized countries  (the so-called ‘Annex B c ountries’) committed 
themselves to an emission ceiling and the possibility of trading GHG, for ex-
ample CO2 emission permits. The EU as a whole committed itself to reduce 
emissions of GHG by 8% whereas the US must reduce its emissions by 7% 




Why did the climate negotiations in The Hague fail? This question, which deals 
with a most recent event, has not been addressed in literature yet. Our attempt is 
to do so and extract lessons when considering future negotiations such as the 
one planned in Bonn.
2 Our contribution is to argue that the conflict between the 
European Union and the (EU) and the United States (US) stems mainly from 
disagreement on the cost issue and that it should be solved by fewer restrictions 
on free GHG trade thus allowing full use of the hot air option.
3 Hot air means 
that the granted quota of permits is higher than actual emission. 
 
                                                                 
1   While delegates in Kyoto agreed to these emissions reductions targets and methods, it was left 
for subsequent meetings to decide on most of the rules and operational details that will deter-
mine how these cuts are achieved and how countries' efforts are measured and assessed. Al-
though many countries have signed the Protocol, the majority are waiting until these opera-
tional details are negotiated before deciding whether or not to ratify. To enter into force, the 
Protocol must be ratified by 55 Parties to the UNFCCC, including Annex I Parties representing 
at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990. Currently, only 30 Parties have 
ratified the Protocol. ENB (2000). 
2   Conference of the Parties at its sixth session (resumed), 16 - 27 July 2001, Bonn, Germany. 
3   The six GHG gases included in the Protocol are: (1) carbon dioxide (CO2), (2) methane (CH4) 
and (3) nitrous oxide (N2O). Also included are three types of chloroflurocarbons (CFCs), 
namely  (4) hydroflurocarbons (HFCs), (5) perflurocarbons (PFCs), and (6) sulfur hexafluride 
(SF6). EPA (2001).  
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Basically, the EU had three main concerns in The Hague.
4 First, the EU was 
reluctant to allow unrestricted trade. Rather, the EU promoted a moral respon-
sibility for national emission ceilings so that each country should reduce 50% of 
its reduction commitment nationally (the so-called supplementarity principle
5). 
In other words, a country cannot meet its target level by buying all the needed 
quotas from e.g. Russia, which has large hot air holdings.
6  
 
Secondly, the EU was most reluctant to accept the US claim for allowing the 
use of ‘carbon sinks’ in forests and agriculture. These first two points put re-
strictions on free GHG trade thereby raising reduction costs. Essentially, the 
breakdown at The Hague can be attributed to different opinions about what was 
agreed upon in the Kyoto protocol concerning these two points. 
 
Thirdly, the EU was worried that no adequate control system could be put in 
place sufficiently strong to monitor and enforce the market. This point concern-
ing an effective control system is a general problem that must be solved in any 
case if a potential GHG market is going to work, see Svendsen (1998) concern-
ing the US national experience on this matter. 
 
In this paper, we focus exclusively on the conflict between the two political 
main actors, namely EU and the US. Because the US is expected to face higher 
economic growth than the EU, the Kyoto-agreement will eventually be consid-
erably more restrictive on the US than on the EU.  
 
Regarding the relative bargaining power between these two, it is important to 
note that in the EU proposal, where trading should only be supplementary to 
domestic action, trade is expected to be reduced by 200 MtC (compared to un-
restricted trade) of which 2/3 is reduced hot air trading. Note that if the US does 
                                                                 
4   A summary of the whole event in The Hague is provided by the ENB (2000). See also 
Woeldman (2001). 
5   Zhang (2000): For a selling country: 5% of {(its base year emissions multiplied by 5 + assigned 
amount)/2} For a buying country: 50% of the difference between its annual actual emissions in 
any year between 1994 and 2002, multiplied by 5, and its assigned amount. 
6   Zhang (2000) and Nentjes and Woeldman (2000) have calculated the effect of the EU proposal 
on the amount of traded Hot Air.  
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not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, emissions are expected to increase by 600 MtC! 
Hence, it is most important to make the US join the agreement. If not, the EU 
run the risk of provoking a situation with significantly less environmental pro-
tection compared to a more politically acceptable solution to the US. 
 
In the next three sections, we will briefly look at the three main concerns in the 
EU. Section 2 looks at the issue of hot air and national emission ceilings. Sec-
tion 3 looks at carbon sinks. Section 4 deals with the control system. Section 5 
focuses on the cost issue. These analyses lead to a concluding policy recom-
mendation in Section 6. 
2.  Hot air and emission ceiling 
Crucial to our argument is that some countries received ’hot air’ permit alloca-
tions. ‘Hot air’ means, for example, that Russia’s actual emission level is lower 
than  the number of grandfathered permits. ‘Grandfathering’ simply means that 
the property right to emission rights is freely transferred on the basis of certain 
distribution rules (Tietenberg, 1985). In the case of the Kyoto agreement, GHG 
emission rights are allocated due to 1990 levels, i.e. historical emission rights. 
 
Nentjes and Woeldman (2000) and Woeldman (2001) argue that since the 
Kyoto figures were negotiated on the prospect (at least from the side of the US 
and Russia) of the availability of free access to three flexible mechanisms, the 
presence of hot air cannot be seen independent of the negotiated target levels in 
Kyoto. We take the view that countries will only enter an agreement if they per-
ceive that they receive a net gain from participation. Otherwise, on may expect an 
unstable agreement that is not likely to succeed. This view is e.g. supported by 
Barrett (1998), Bohm (1999) and Sandler (1997). 
 
Although the hot air provision appears to be a loophole, had it not been created, 
other Annex 1 countries would have insisted that their own emission constraints 
should be relaxed. If the use of hot air is restricted, the agreement will no longer 
be a true commitment because some countries might no longer receive net gains 
from participation. This argument is supported by the papers of Bohm (1992)  
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and Boom (2000). The latter shows, in a fairly general model, that it is rational 
for low cost (potentially selling) countries opt for higher emission level and for 
high cost (potentially buying) to accept a more stringent emission ceiling (com-
pared to the situation without trade) when permit trading is feasible. This is ex-
plained by the fact that increases in the total trade volume increases implying 
lower reduction cost for the buying country and higher total payment to the sell-
ing country. The US position in the Hague mirrors this: The original Kyoto re-
sults were based on the presumption of free trade, the full and unlimited access 
to all three flexible mechanisms (i.e. permit trading, joint implementation and 
clean development mechanism) in the Protocol. 
 
Hot air is important in economic terms. Note, that as a consequence of the pre-
defined target levels, hot air distributions do not affect the desired total emis-
sions reduction compared to 1990 levels. Since trading (including the possibility 
of hot air trading) only reallocates the reduction responsibility, the overall target 
of a 5.2% reduction will not be watered down. However, the presence of hot air 
can mean that countries do not have to undertake real reductions when actual 
emissions are already lower than 1990 levels. For example, Russia can sell their 
25 per cent surplus of permits to the United States, thus relieving the latter of 
the responsibility to reduce domestic emissions, i.e. total emissions of GHG in 
Russia dropped by 25 per cent from 1990 to 1995 (from 3.000 million tonnes to 
2.250 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent), UNEP (2000). In other words, this 
means that Russia in 1995 could sell this extra 25 per cent (corresponding to 
750 million permits)  without having to u ndertake any reduction efforts. Also 
other countries were rewarded by hot air distributions. For example, German 
reductions have, to a significant degree, been the result of economic restructur-
ing in former Eastern Germany since 1990, while British reductions have been 
an unintended outcome of privatization in Britain’s energy sector (Ringius, 
1999, 23).  
 
Let us now turn to the cost effects following the political constraints of hot air 




Table 1.  Costs of meeting Kyoto target for OECD-countries under different 
scenarios ($MtC) 














Clinton adm (1998)  -  14-23  - 
Nordhaus-Boyer (1998)  125  11  - 
Manne-Richels (1998)  240  70  - 
Zhang (2000)  -  9.7  79 
Nentjes-Woeldman (2000)  250  -  - 
Average
d  205  27,3  79 
a) The marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto target, when no flexible mechanisms are 
feasible. 
b) The marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto target with unlimited access to flexible 
mechanisms. 
c) The marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto target when trade is limited according to 
EU’s supplementarity proposal.  
d) The average of column entries. 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
The average figures from Table 1 are used in Figure 1 below. Here, we have 
illustrated how the presence of hot air affects the permit price. In case of no 
trade at all, the marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto-target amounts to 
205$MtC (the average of the marginal cost numbers without flexibility reported 
in column 2). For any permit price below 205$MtC, there will be a demand for 
permits. The lower the price, the larger the volume of this demand, as indicated 
in the  figure by a downward sloping demand curve for permits
7. An  unre-
stricted permit market, assuming a well functioning market and a global pollut-
                                                                 
7   The demand curve for permits can be defined as a country’s willingness to pay in order to 
avoid another unit of reduction (which is equal to the marginal abatement cost). The supply 
curve, the cost of providing another permit is simply the marginal abatement cost, the opportu-
nity costs of reduction. Therefore the supply curve at the first unit of permits is equal to the 
lowest marginal cost of meeting the Kyoto-target, while the demand curve is the highest cost.  
12 
ant, means that each participating country equalizes its MC to the equilibrium 
permit price.
8  If free trade is allowed, the equilibrium price of 27.3$MtC re-
sults. 
 
Part of this trade is attributed to hot air. Since hot air is emission, which can be 
provided without any costly reduction effort, it can be provided at zero costs, 
shifting the supply curve to the right. In Figure 1, this is illustrated by a shift in 
the supply curve from S
-Hot Air to S
+Hot Air. The effect is that trade increases and 
equilibrium price is depressed.  
 
















Source: The authors 
 
The problem of hot air only occurs when trading is allowed. An example by 
Barrett  (1998) illustrates this: The  US emission cannot exceed 4.6 units, 
whereas Russia is entitled to emit 2.39 units.
9 Thus, total allowed emission for 
both countries is 6.99 units. However, due to the economic conditions, Russia is 
only expected to emit 1.98 units. Hence, the total emission of the two countries 
will amount to 6.59 units. If trade is allowed, the total emission will reach the 
                                                                 
Permits will be traded until the cost a buying country avoids by emitting one unit more is equal 
to the cost a selling country incurs of reducing another unit. 
8   The marginal costs under free trade are equal to the permit price under free trade. The reason is 
that each country can either buy permits or reduce its emission, and it will always choose the 
cheapest option. In this way, no MC will ever be above the permit price in equilibrium. It can-
not be lower either, since then this country could reduce additional and sell with a gain 
9   Where a unit is equal to 1 million gigagrams of CO2.  
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6.99 units. Consequently, trading eases the total constraint by 0.4 units. The dif-
ference between the trading and the non-trading case can now for obvious rea-
sons be referred to as ‘hot air’. 
 
In case of the EU supplementarity proposal, restrictions are placed on both sup-
ply and demand. Basically, the EU proposal restricts each country’s ability to 
sell or buy, such that it does not exceed 50% of a country’s total reduction obli-
gation. We will now show how he EU supplementarity proposal places restric-
tions on the volume of both demand and supply in each country. For simplicity, 
we assume in Figure 2 below that this implies a steeper demand curve, due to 
the reduction in each country’s amount of demands.
10 The result being that for 
each permit price, the total demand is lowered. On the other hand, supply is re-
stricted as well, because each county faces an upper limit on the amount that it 
is allowed to sell, implying an increased slope of the supply curve. 
 
















Source: The authors 
 
According to Table 1, the implication of restricted trade according to the EU 
subsidiarity proposal is that the permit price increases, in our example to 
79$MtC. A part of this reduction concerns hot air. Nentjes and Woeldman 
(2000) have estimated that this restriction indeed reduces the total hot air quotas 
                                                                 
10  Which can be accepted due to aggregation of the countries individual demand-curves.  
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in circulation by 2/3 and imposes considerably costs on the US. Hence, the EU 
supplementarity proposal has a strong restricting effect on hot air trade indeed. 
3.  Carbon Sinks 
The change in the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere depends both on the 
emission path but also on the removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. Hence, 
measures for removing CO2 from the a tmosphere establish another important 
policy instrument to reach the proposed policy targets. Among the most useful 
options are reforestation, reduced deforestation and changes in the land use so 
that the take-up of CO2 is increased. In total, these measures are referred to as 
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
 
The cost effect of including LULUFC when meeting the Kyoto-target is clear as 
it provides yet another option for reducing emission; it will in general lower re-
duction costs though, according to Stavins (1998), the marginal costs of carbon 
sequestration rise steeply. 
 
The inclusion of these sinks is, however, as noted by ENB (2000), both com-
plex and controversial. Plants and soils can act as carbon sinks, but the science 
of estimating how much carbon is being removed from the atmosphere is uncer-
tain. Including the use of sinks in meeting targets on emissions will require a 
clear definition of a sink, as well as clarity on what changes are the result of de-
liberate climate policies. Parties must also agree on accounting systems that set 
the baselines and measure carbon changes. Issues of the permanence of carbon 
storage achieved through forests and other sinks must also be addressed, given 
that such carbon can be lost due to felling, forest fires and other factors.  
4.  Control System 
Finally, in response to the third main objection stated by the EU, we suggest 
that an international control system  can work. First, it is necessary to establish  
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an international authority. Second, this authority must enforce a sanctions sys-
tem. Let us look at these two elements in turn. 
 
An international authority that could manage such an international permit trad-
ing scheme among governments would be the World Trade Organization. The 
World Trade Organization is based in Geneva and already covers the 38 Annex 
B countries. In total, the World Trade Organization has more than 130 mem-
bers, accounting for over 90 per cent of world trade (WTO, 2000a). It has ex-
tensive experience in settling trade disputes and seems to have the necessary 
sanctions to enforce global permit trade. 
 
Concerning an adequate sanction system, a country’s emission of CO2 can be 
calculated directly from its total use of fossil fuels. This is administratively 
much easier than having to get exact emission figures for each firm in the firm-
trading scheme. Therefore it is relatively simple to find out, on the basis of pro-
duction, export and import of fossil fuels, whether the CO2 emission from a par-
ticular country exceeds the amount of CO2 permits. On the other hand it is more 
problematic to impose sanctions on a country that tries to cheat. E.g., Russia 
could be tempted to sell more permits than she is qualified to thus benefiting 
both from participation and breaking the rules. 
 
The World Trade Organization could impose various sanctions on countries that 
break the rules. Such sanctions could be trade sanctions, retention of loans, 
freezing of claims, exclusion from further participation in the market and heavy 
fines. In fact, the Uruguay Round from 1994 has made it easier to implement 
such sanctions. Now, it is impossible for a country losing a case to block the 
adoption of a sanction. Under the previous GATT procedure, sanctions could 
only be adopted by consensus, meaning that a single objection could block it. 
Now, sanctions are automatically adopted unless there is a consensus to reject 
them s o that any opposing country has to persuade all other countries (WTO, 
2000b). 
 
The total effect of the sanctions must be so significant that it by far exceeds the 
possible gains from cheating. It is feasible too to renew the permits within a  
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short time period, for example five or ten years, and also to devaluate them if 
negotiations among the participating countries lead to tighter target levels. It 
will not pay to cheat if permits are renewed periodically and if cheating coun-
tries are excluded from the program, that is, further profitable trade in the fu-
ture. 
 
If the World Trade Organization can enforce the market, the achievement of the 
defined target levels will be accomplished. The 38 countries that signed the 
climate agreement will be given a CO2 quota of permits corresponding to their 
emission in 1990. In this way, the number of CO2 permits in circulation is ‘fro-
zen’ and the CO2 emission cannot increase further. Then each individual coun-
try will face devaluations of its permit holdings corresponding to the target 
level for that country. 
 
Devaluation will, at the latest, take place in year 2012 at which time the goal of 
the CO2 reduction must be achieved. If the United States wishes to maintain its 
CO2 emission at the 1990 level, the United States must buy permits from other 
countries corresponding to 7 per cent of United States total emission. Countries 
like Russia, which will reduce and sell CO2 permits to the economically more 
developed industrialized countries, are rewarded financially in this way. Coun-
tries lagging behind will receive important subsidies to make new investments 
in order to revitalize outdated and run-down industries. In this way the devalua-
tion of CO2 permits will ensure that the world as a whole achieves the stipulated 
reduction in CO2 emission by the year 2012 (Svendsen, 1998). 
5.  Cost Issue 
5.1  Cost Scenario 
We will now elaborate the crucial cost issue, which seemed to be the most im-
portant explanation for the The Hague breakdown. As noted above, the EU is 
obligated to reduce GHG emissions 8% and the US 7% from 1990-2012. How-
ever, when economic growth is taken into account, the US faces a harder re-
striction the EU expects a 0.8% annual increase whereas the US expects a 1.3%  
17 
annual increase in CO2-emission As shown in Figure 3, this implies that the US, 
compared to ‘Business-As-Usual’ (BAU) emission levels, will have to reduce 
39.0% to meet their Kyoto target, while the EU, again compared to BAU, only 
faces  25.3% reduction.
11 Even more striking differences are found in Zhang 
(2000), with the number 2.6% for EU and 23.1% for US.
12  
 



































Source: Based on IEA (2000).
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The numbers indicate the real reduction implied by the Kyoto agreement, taking 
into account  the national business-as-usual (BAU) growth rate of CO2-
emissions. Thus, in year 2010, the US can expect to reduce significantly more 
than the EU and is, as such, exposed to higher marginal reduction costs. The 
EU and the US are roughly situated at the same technological level. Assume 
therefore, to make things as simple as possible, that the EU and the US face the 
same marginal reduction cost curve for GHG (MC). The aggregated marginal 
                                                                 
11  The baseline scenario reflects the non-policy case. That is, a situation where, compared to 
1990, no specific GHG-emission reductions have been implemented. 
12  The figures are not easily comparable, since the figures reported in Zhang (2000) reflect a 
situation where the EU already has taken some policy measures to combat mitigate CO2 emis-
sions. 
13  Calculated as ((1+x)
t-1990-1)*100+Kyoto reduction, where x is annual projected growth in CO2-
equivalent emissions, with t=actual years.   
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reduction costs for both the EU and the US is labeled MCagg, see Figure 4 be-
low. 
 
Figure 4. Marginal reduction cost curves for the US and the EU, without 
permit trading 
  
Source: The authors. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates how the US face higher total reduction costs in year 2010 
than the EU. It also shows that cooperation (international agreement) makes it 
cheaper to reduce the GHG amount of Q* = Qeu + Qus at the marginal cost of 
P*. Figure 4 below indicates that without trading, the marginal costs of meeting 
the Kyoto-targets are high. The US face the high marginal cost of Pus. 
 
Faced with this cost scenario, the US want to add carbon sinks in forests and 
agriculture to save costs. In other words, the US would get free GHG permits 
from already existing carbon sinks within the US itself and new reduction op-
tions in the future both domestically and internationally. Also, the private good 
claim of hot air seems to be needed as compensation for less international GHG 
trade. If e.g. Russia does not get ‘extra permits’ and is only allowed to trade 
with the US to a most limited extent, then the gains from trade will diminish.  
Both Russia and the Ukraine were allowed to stabilize emissions at their 1990 











and would reward Russia and the Ukraine too by transferring additional foreign 
currency to them (Daugbjerg and Svendsen, 2001). 
 
The loss from less GHG trade is illustrated in Figure 5 by the triangle above 
MBus and below MCus. 
 
Figure 5. Change in US GHG reduction cost from Kyoto to The Hague 
Source: The authors. 
 
Note, that the drawn MBus curve is hypothetical. Its location and shape are un-
known and therefore uncertainty about the net result prevails. The lack of in-
formation concerning the MBus has probably reinforced the US focus on MC. 
5.2  Individual net gain 
A minimum requirement for participation is that each participant perceives a 
net gain from entering the agreement. The Kyoto-agreement is a climate change 
protocol that makes a difference compared to earlier agreements as it incorpo-
rates targets and timetables, and especially implies reductions in access of what 
countries would have done without any co-operation. According to Barrett 
(1998), such a situation makes ratification highly problematic, as long as ques-
tions related to free-riding, non-compliance and t he prospect of cost-effective 










In contrast, voluntary participation will take place, no matter what the other 
countries do, if reducing unilaterally is beneficial to an individual country. This 
case is, for example, known from depletion of the ozone layer. Here, according 
to Sandler (1997),
14 the US could easily benefit from a unilateral 50% cut-back 
of CFC-releases. If participation is perceived too costly, no agreement will ever 
be established. As an example of this, in the forefront of the Second Sulphur 
Protocol, Denmark had to reduce S02 emission by 87 percent, which was totally 
unacceptable for Denmark, since reducing SO2 by 87 % reduction was twice as 
expensive as total reduction costs at the 80% level (Steiner and Svendsen, 
2000). Similarly, Tietenberg lists a number of pollutants where extensive cost-
benefit analyses have been undertaken nationally in the US (Tietenberg, 2000), 
for example groundwater contamination, diesel odour reduction, wildlife view-
ing, asbestos, arsenic etc. In contrast to CO2, the MB curves are pretty well 
known in such cases. 
 
The fact that the EU wants to ensure that the Kyoto-mechanisms are supple-
mental to domestic actions has, as mentioned above, resulted in a specific 50% 
emission ceiling on the use of the three mechanisms to ensure that a balance is 
achieved between these and necessary domestic actions. It seems that the EU 
claim has made the former positive US net gain from participation negative. 
Therefore, future negotiations must seek an instrumental design that makes the 
US net gain from participation positive. If not, GHG emissions will be i n-
creased further. 
 
Zhang (2000) suggests that hot air increases CO2 emissions by 105 MtC. If, on 
the other hand, the US choose their BAU instead of the Kyoto-target, CO2 
emissions increase by 423.9 MtC. Nentjes and Woeldman (2000) report that if 
the US do not ratify, then an GHG increase by 14% will occur (27.3 vs. 31 bil-
lion ton CO2). Hence, the increase in GHG emissions by far exceeds the GHG 
reduction from limiting hot air trading if the US do not implement their Kyoto 
target level. 
                                                                 
14  Also Montreal Protocol – CFC – Paid the US to act on its own (which they did); Sandler, 1997, 
p.107).  
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6.  Conclusion 
Our main question focused on identifying the main reasons behind the col-
lapsed climate negotiations in The Hague. We argued that three disputed main 
concerns were promoted by the European Union in The Hague, i.e. a 50% na-
tional emission ceiling (the supplementarity principle), the use of carbon sinks 
and an international market control system. Because the US faced significantly 
higher future reduction costs than t he EU, the US would, given the EU pro-
posal, be imposed  considerably higher costs than the negotiations in Kyoto 
were based on.  
 
The Kyoto agreement was negotiated on the basis of free access to hot air. 
However, cold air arose among the negotiators in The Hague mainly due to the 
EU supplementarity proposal, i.e. that each country should reduce 50% of its 
reduction commitment nationally. This modified design results in higher future 
reduction costs for the US in particular due to expected higher economic growth 
than in the EU. We suggest that this political deadlock be solved by fewer re-
strictions on free GHG trade and by establishing the World Trade Organization 
as international authority. 
 
Because the treaty implies costly action, the prospect of its success depends 
crucially on the ability to reach the stipulated targets at minimum costs. In this 
way, our main contribution is to argue that the conflict between the EU and the 
US stems mainly from disagreement on the cost issue. If the cost implications 
following the EU proposal are ignored, the possibility of a total breakdown in 
future negotiations is severely increased and this will hamper joint efforts to 
improve global environment. From our analysis, it is evident that the EU sup-
plementarity proposal will reduce hot air by considerably less than the increase 
in emissions if the US does not participate. 
 
Therefore, there is a strong need to suggest an instrumental design that ensures 
the US a positive net gain so that the Kyoto target level will be fully accom-
plished. The net gain to any of the 38 Annex B countries member (individual 
costs minus individual benefits) should be positive. When negotiations failed in  
22 
The Hague, this simple precondition for successful negotiations seems not to 
have been fulfilled. There must be an individual economic reward for participa-
tion. 
 
We recommend, in contrast to the EU, that no supplementarity principle should 
be implemented and that hot air should be traded freely. Furthermore, in an at-
tempt to lower permit price further, carbon sinks in forests and agriculture 
should be considered too as an option so that more countries now will get an 
economic reward from participation. The most appropriate institution for e n-
forcing a global GHG market  - another worry within the EU  –  could be the 
WTO. Only the WTO seems to possess the needed sanction mechanisms to de-
ter any attempts to cheat. 
 
In essence, compared to the Kyoto agreement, the US is likely to stick to the 
Kyoto agreement if permit price is minimized by removing restrictions on GHG 
trade such as the supplementarity principle. Thus, future research should focus 
more on the cost issue linked to these global climate negotiations. Another in-
teresting point would be to analyze why this difference in negotiation positions 
occur, i.e. why the US focuses more on the establishment of low-cost permits 
than the EU. 
 
Thus, to make the US stay in an international GHG emission-trading scheme, 
the EU must reconsider and acknowledge US claims for cheaper reduction op-
tions and the right to trade ‘hot air.’ This point is important. If the US does not 
participate, cold air among negotiators will stay and the increase in emissions 
will be much higher than the emission reduction following the EU supplemen-
tarity proposal.  
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